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Reorienting Japan? 
Security Transformation 
Under the Second Abe Cabinet
Hiroshi Nakanishi
In this article, I provide an overview of the major security and de-
fense changes achieved by the second Abe Shinzo cabinet and ana-
lyze why Abe was reasonably successful. Based on analysis of the
major Japanese strategic guidelines, the new National Security
Council, and legal arguments on interpretations of the constitution,
I argue that Abe’s security and defense reforms are not unique to his
ideology or political stance but follow the general trend Japan has
pursued in the last two decades. What is unique about Abe is his
drive and political tact to ram through these reforms. These reforms
are also suited to shift Japan’s geopolitical focus away from the
Asian continent and toward the Eurasian littoral and maritime
areas, where Japan sees more economic and political opportunities
without the historical controversies it faces in East Asia. KEYWORDS:
Abe Shinzo, Japan’s constitution, collective self-defense, US-Japan
defense relations.
WHEN ABE SHINZO RETURNED AS PRIME MINISTER IN DECEMBER 2012,
foreign and security policy was not something that most con-
cerned the Japanese people. After the severe economic recession
that followed the Lehman Brothers shock, the March 11 earth-
quake in eastern Japan, and the revolving door phenomenon of six
prime ministers since 2006, the Japanese people voted for the
comeback of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) cabinet. After
the short-lived and generally disappointing mismanagement of the
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government, the LDP was
viewed as a return to stability and economic recovery. Abe’s own
comeback did not augur well initially as people remembered his
abrupt resignation in September 2006 when he first served as
prime minister and his well-known enthusiasm for dealing with
foreign and national security policy rather than domestic eco-
nomic management.
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Now, after more than two years as prime minister, Abe has
maintained a relatively high popular approval and has succeeded in
stemming the initial skepticism. No doubt, the so-called Abe-
nomics has been the key policy that has allowed Abe to rule in
general comfort. But he has already achieved several important
security and defense reforms, overriding domestic political debate.
In this article, I provide a brief overview of the major security
and defense changes the second Abe cabinet has implemented and
analyze why Abe was reasonably successful despite domestic crit-
icism. I argue that Abe’s security and defense reforms are not
unique to his ideology or political stance but follow the general
trend Japan has pursued in the last two decades. What is most
unique about Abe is his drive and political tact to ram through
these reforms. At the same time, Abe’s conservative ideology on
history and education has gathered criticism and wariness from
both within and without, leading Japan’s geopolitical focus away
from the Asian continent and toward the southwest maritime
areas. There, Japan sees a more economic frontier and political
associability with much less historical controversy. 
As a result, Abe’s “proactive contribution to peace” policies
do not mean simply moving away from the postwar Yoshida Doc-
trine of not resorting to force beyond Japan’s borders. Combined
with an overall foreign policy reformulation, Abe’s security and
defense policies both reflect and initiate a long-term foreign pol-
icy change that goes beyond the traditional East/West dichotomy
or simplistic postwar orthodoxy/revisionism.
Security and Defense Reforms Under the Abe Cabinet
In fewer than thirty months since returning to power, Prime Min-
ister Abe has undertaken more security and defense reforms than
any previous prime minister. The Abe cabinet has changed the
doctrinal, institutional, and legal frameworks of Japanese secu-
rity and defense policy. Whether one likes or dislikes these
changes—according to recent polls, 51 percent of the Japanese
public remain wary of the collective defense legislation against
31 percent supporting it—the Abe cabinet unquestionably has
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been quite efficient in bringing these changes about (Nikkei Asian
Review 2015). 
But extraordinary efficiency does not mean the changes made
are truly novel or pathbreaking. Indeed, despite the rhetoric of the
administration, the changes made are more the result of debate
and incremental policy changes that took place in the last two
decades. The reforms under the Abe cabinet, at least so far, are
more of the climax than the start of the security reforms.
The security and defense reforms under the current Abe cabi-
net can be summarized in four categories: (1) doctrinal changes
published in the key strategic documents, such as the National
Security Strategy (NSS 2013) and National Defense Program
Guidelines (NDPG 2013); (2) institutional changes by establish-
ing the National Security Council (NSC); (3) legal changes—
revising previous interpretations of the constitution and other leg-
islative and regulatory codes; and (4) operational changes in
formulating new Japan-US defense guidelines.
Doctrinal Changes
Just after returning to power, Abe’s cabinet expressed its willing-
ness to revise the NDPG issued by the previous DPJ government
in 2010. Following a decision by the newly established NSC, the
cabinet on December 17, 2013, approved the NSS and NDPG
documents and the new Medium-Term Defense Program (MTDP
2013), the last of which directs defense procurement plans for the
next five years.
The 2004 NDPG operated as the only basic strategic docu-
ment for Japanese security and defense policy. The new NSS
enlarges the “strategic” part of its predecessor, while the 2013
NDPG revises the “defense policy” part of the same document.
The key phrase of the NSS, the basic formulation of the secu-
rity doctrine of the Abe cabinet in general, is sekkyokuteki hei-
washugi (proactive contribution to peace). According to the NSS
(2013), 
surrounded by an increasingly severe security environment and
confronted by complex and grave national security challenges, it
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has become indispensable for Japan to make more proactive efforts
in line with the principle of international cooperation. Japan cannot
secure its own peace and security by itself, and the international
community expects Japan to play a more proactive role for peace
and stability in the world, in a way commensurate with its national
capabilities.
The reference to an “increasingly severe security environment” is
meant, the NSS states, to highlight global issues: changes in the
global balance of power, proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, international terrorism, risks to global commons,
human security challenges, and economic risks. It also refers to
Asia Pacific regional issues, specifically, North Korea’s military
buildup and China’s rise. 
The assessment of the NSS generally reflects the Japanese
people’s current mind-set. An opinion poll conducted by the Cab-
inet Office shows that the Japanese people have become more
interested in the Self-Defense Forces (SDFs) and defense affairs
in the last two decades. Those who are interested increased from
56.8 percent in 1994 to 71.5 percent in 2015, and those who are
not interested declined from 40.8 percent in 1994 to 28.2 percent
(Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister 2015, 1). The chief reason
given by those who are interested has also shifted, from “disaster
relief operations and other matters closely connected to people’s
lives” (36.3 percent in 1997) to “problems relating to Japanese
peace and independence” (46.1 percent) (Cabinet Office of the
Prime Minister 2015, 2). 
According to the same poll, the top five major concerns of the
public are China’s military modernization and maritime activities
(60.5 percent); situations on the Korean peninsula (52.7 percent);
activities of international terrorist organizations (42.6 percent); the
military posture of US forces in areas surrounding Japan (36.7 per-
cent); and relations between the United States and China (32 per-
cent). In addition, an interesting change has occurred in the leading
agenda, from the Korean peninsula (the top concern in 2012 at
64.9 percent) to Chinese military modernization (second in 2012 at
46 percent) (Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister 2015, 21). The
survey conforms with other polls in Japan, suggesting that the NSS
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follows the general trend of public feelings about the deterioration
of Japan’s security environment, particularly on matters relating to
peace and independence and China’s rise and its maritime activi-
ties, rather than solely reflecting the Abe cabinet’s perceptions.
In order to cope with these changes in security environment, the
NSS proposes to (1) strengthen and expand Japan’s own capabilities
and roles, (2) strengthen the Japan-US alliance, (3) strengthen
diplomacy and security cooperation with Japan’s partners for peace
and stability in the international community, and (4) proactively
contribute to international efforts for peace and stability. 
The 2013 NDPG provides more details. It introduces the con-
cept of “Dynamic Joint Defense Force,” replacing the “Dynamic
Defense Force” concept proposed in 2010 under the DPJ govern-
ment. But as the name shows, the two concepts are roughly the
same. According to the National Institute for Defense Studies
report, the “2013 NDPG can be viewed as a continuation” of the
2010 NDPG and the longer trend of Japanese defense transforma-
tions in the post–Cold War era (National Institute for Defense
Studies 2014, 56–59). The clear change, the report judges, is that
the 2013 NDPG reverses the declining trend of the defense budget
for the first time in ten years.
Therefore the difference between the 2013 NDPG and its
recent predecessors is more of quantity rather than quality. The
document emphasizes increased jointness among the air, land, and
maritime forces; prioritization of air and maritime superiority; and
strengthening of deterrent capability in gray-zone situations. The
gray-zone situations refer to “confrontations over territory, sover-
eignty and economic interests that do not escalate into wars.” A
typical case of a gray-zone situation is the low-level intrusion by
Chinese vessels into the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands maritime areas,
which intensified drastically after the Japanese government
announced transfer of the ownership of some of the Senkaku
Islands to governmental hands in 2012. The 2013 NDPG
announces that Japan intends to “clearly express its resolve not to
tolerate the change of status quo by force.” 
The defense procurement plan shows clear emphasis on mar-
itime and air capabilities. Diesel-propelled Soryu-class sub-
marines are to increase from sixteen to twenty-two units, two
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Izumo-class helicopter destroyers are already in production, and
the number of Aegis destroyers equipped with SM-3 missile sys-
tems is to increase from four to six. In addition to the F-35 com-
bat aircraft the DPJ government decided to procure, the Abe cab-
inet will establish an amphibious unit and purchase seventeen
V-22 Osprey aircraft. The government has also begun to build a
radar station on Yonaguni island, 100 kilometers east of Taiwan
and around 150 kilometers from the Senkaku Islands (Sakaki
2015). But because of well-known fiscal constraints, the govern-
ment needs to streamline less prioritized sectors. For example, the
number of tanks and artillery pieces will be cut to 300 each from
the current 700 and 600, respectively (Yoshihara 2014). 
Institutional Change: The Japanese Version of the NSC
Less than a month before the NSS and NDPG were approved, the
Abe cabinet legislated to establish the Japanese version of the NSC.
This was another long-term project. The first Abe cabinet was
enthusiastic to establish this organization, but political confusion
and Abe’s resignation ended the effort. Nonetheless, later prime
ministers continued to pursue prime minister–centered foreign pol-
icy planning and decisionmaking organization (Sunohara 2014). 
When Abe returned to power, he quickly restarted the effort to
establish the NSC. In late 2013, the NSC was formally estab-
lished, followed by the creation of the National Security Secre-
tariat. To head it, Abe nominated Yachi Shotaro, the former vice
minister in the foreign ministry during the Koizumi Junichiro and
first Abe cabinet periods, from 2005 to 2008 (Research Institute
on Peace and Security 2014). The intended roles of the NSC are
stronger policy integration to cope with security environment
change, higher priority on crisis management, strengthening of
the capability of the prime minister’s office, and international syn-
chronization at the institutional level (Research Institute on Peace
and Security 2014).
The first three roles are overlapping. In the post–Cold War
era, security issues have become quite diverse compared with the
Cold War period, where the avoidance of East-West military con-
flict occupied the highest priority. In order to cope with the vari-
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ous types of risks and emergencies, interagency flexibility and
integration under the top leadership have become indispensable. 
The Japanese NSC actually combines three types of minister-
level conferences. The first is the nine-minister conference, which
has been around since the 1950s to secure civilian control over the
Self-Defense Forces. The four-minister conference is the core of
the new NSC; it consists of the prime minister, the ministers of
foreign affairs and defense, and the chief cabinet secretary. The
conference decides the basic strategic policy, such as the NSS,
and discusses important matters relating to diplomacy and secu-
rity. The third type is the emergency situation conference, whose
members are flexibly designated by the prime minister along with
the cabinet secretary. Upon invitation by the prime minister, top
uniformed staff such as the chairman of the Joint Staff can partic-
ipate and make comments in any of the conferences (Research
Institute on Peace and Security 2014).
The national security secretariat is authorized to have wide-
ranging authority to coordinate the cabinet secretariat. At the time
of its creation in January 2014, the secretariat had sixty-seven
staff drawn mainly from the ministries of foreign affairs and
defense, and had six units (general coordination, policy units 1 to
3 with geographical specialization, strategic planning, and intelli-
gence). One of the secretariat’s roles is to handle secret intelli-
gence, including intelligence shared with the United States and
other friendly powers. Yachi, as head of the secretariat, is the offi-
cial designee to meet with his US or other counterpart. The Abe
cabinet created the Act on the Protection of the Specially Desig-
nated Secrets in order to increase intelligence sharing, but the act
created greater havoc among the public than the creation of the
NSC.
Legal Changes Surrounding the Constitution 
and Other Regulations
Revising Article 9
Interpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese constitution has been
one of the most contentious political issues in postwar Japan.
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After the Cold War, many people called for changing the article or
its past interpretation so that Japanese defense forces could play
more roles abroad. But such views were still in the minority in
public opinion.
Ever since his first cabinet, Abe Shinzo has been intent on
tackling this politically divisive issue. He has been quite explicit
in declaring that revising the constitution itself is his ultimate
objective; but his initial objective is to revise the interpretation of
the constitution so that Japan can exercise the right of collective
self-defense, an interpretation that postwar leaders have so far
rejected. In his first cabinet Abe commissioned experts to review
the legal basis for a constitutional reinterpretation. The group’s
report was finalized after Abe resigned and it was shelved by later
prime ministers; but Abe reassembled the experts group in the
second cabinet. The group issued a new report in May 2014. On
July 1, the Abe cabinet approved the Cabinet Decision on Devel-
opment of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Sur-
vival and Protect Its People (Nakauchi 2014).
Detailed legal debate aside (which is almost unintelligible
beyond Japanese linguistic phraseology), the crux of the matter is
political consensus on the legal allowance for the exercise of
force. Postwar Japanese security and defense policy was based on
the consensus that Japan will not resort to force except for its own
self-defense. This was the politico-legal basis of the so-called
Yoshida Doctrine. At the same time, it needs to be noted that
revising this self-restraint has been a long-running issue in Japan.
Yoshida Shigeru, the prime minister in the early postwar period,
desired to change the interpretation (Choong 2015). 
After the end of the Cold War, Japan decided to send the SDF
on UN peacekeeping operations or on disaster relief missions.
Tokyo also dispatched noncombat units to postconflict Iraq and
on antipiracy operations along the Somalia coast. However, Japan
kept to the principle of not using force beyond its own defense,
partly because of the wariness of the public and partly because of
opposition within the government to changing the interpretation
of the constitution. 
The May report of the commission proposed that the exercise
of collective self-defense and participation in UN collective-
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security activities are both permissible under the current consti-
tution. The July cabinet decision, by contrast, allowed only partial
exercise of the right of collective self-defense and limited use of
arms and logistical support in international peace activities. The
decision thus denied full-fledged participation in collective-secu-
rity measures involving the use of force. Why Abe did not follow
the report completely is unclear. It may have been a result of com-
promise with the governmental legal staff or the Komeito Party,
the LDP’s coalition partner. Another possible reason is that Abe,
who prefers to revise the constitution, wanted to keep some room
for further revision (Sakaki 2015).
Whatever the reason, the cabinet decided that the exercise of
self-defense is permissible “not only when an armed attack
against Japan occurs,” but also “when an armed attack against a
foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs
and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger
to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pur-
suit of happiness.” In other words, the attack on a foreign coun-
try needs to be a clear danger to the survival of the Japanese peo-
ple for Japan to exercise force.
On paper, therefore, Abe’s policy is not as clear a break from
the past interpretation as political circles and the media, both for
and against the revision, make it appear. Rather, the policy is a
result of the long-term debate within the Japanese foreign policy
community and academia on adjusting the legal basis on security
for the post–Cold War era. Nonetheless, the new policy is a mile-
stone in Japanese security and defense history, since it implies
that Japan will exceed the strict limitation of its use of force
beyond territorial self-defense.
Arms Exports
Just before the July cabinet decision, the government made
another significant revision on foreign defense equipment and
technology. Since the late 1960s Japan had imposed strict limita-
tions on arms exports with the exception of technological cooper-
ation with the United States. But in view of the changing nature of
arms production, and the desire to enhance security cooperation
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with allied and friendly powers, the defense industrial sector had
long called for relaxing the near-prohibition on arms exports.
Indeed, in December 2011 under the DPJ government, the previ-
ous arms export restriction was virtually abolished by the cabinet
secretary. 
The Abe cabinet further formalized this revision in April 2014
by adopting “Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment
and Technology.” According to the new principles, transfer of
defense equipment and technology to other countries is prohibited
when (1) the transfer violates obligations under treaties and other
international agreements that Japan has concluded, (2) the transfer
violates obligations under United Nations Security Council reso-
lutions, or (3) the defense equipment and technology is destined
for a country party to a conflict (a country against which the UN
Security Council is taking measures to maintain or restore inter-
national peace and security in the event of an armed attack)
(Sakaki 2015).
Practically, this policy change has opened the way to promot-
ing security and defense cooperation not only with the United
States but also with other friendly powers such as Great Britain,
France, Australia, India, and the ten member countries of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Ministry of
Defense of Japan 2014). 
The July cabinet decision requires changes to be incorporated
into Japanese domestic law. As of April 2015, the LDP-Komeito
discussion on the possible legislation is ongoing. Media reports
indicate that the laws governing armed attack, the surrounding sit-
uation (i.e., conflict in areas near Japan), and international peace
cooperation are being revised and a new law to support foreign
militaries will be enacted (Asahi Shimbun 2015).
Alliance Coordination
Seeking a Strong US Security Commitment
The Abe cabinet has put strong emphasis on deepening the Japan-
US alliance. Indeed, just after Abe returned to power, he desired
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to visit the United States first, but the US government responded
that it was not ready so soon after the reelection of President
Barack Obama. There is no doubt that Abe’s “proactive contribu-
tion to peace” is in response to the request of US Japan-handlers,
as the first Armitage-Nye report originally recommended
(Armitage et al. 2000). In October 2013, at the first Security Con-
sultative Committee (2+2) under the second Abe cabinet, the
United States generally endorsed the actions taken by Japan on
security and defense affairs (US Department of State 2013). 
Strengthening the US-Japan bilateral alliance becomes even
more important for the United States as it starts the so-called
pivot or rebalance to the Asia Pacific. Responding to the rise of
China, particularly regarding maritime activities in the East and
South China Sea areas, the United States finds it necessary to
clarify its commitment to maintaining the status quo and rejecting
changes in it by force. When Obama made his first visit as presi-
dent to Japan in April 2014, he declared that the Senkaku Islands
are subject to Article 5 of the Security Treaty, which states that
the two countries will act against an attack on “territories under
the administration of Japan” (Singh 2014).
After the 2+2 meeting, the crux of the security and defense
reforms of the alliance under the Abe cabinet has boiled down to
revision of the US-Japan defense cooperation guideline. The
guideline has been regarded as the key document directing the
basic operational cooperation between the defense forces of the
two countries. The initial agreement in 1978 mainly applied to the
case of defense of Japan. The revised version in 1997 applied
cooperative defense to “surrounding situations,” particularly
Japanese logistical support to future US operations on the Korean
peninsula. The second revision was initially expected to be com-
pleted by the end of 2014, but because of the necessity of Japan-
ese legislation after the revision of the constitutional interpreta-
tion, the deadline was shifted to sometime in 2015.
New Guidelines and the China Factor
What most interests Japan is ascertaining the US commitment to
the defense of Japan, including the gray-zone cases involving the
Hiroshi Nakanishi 415
offshore islands. For the United States, the expectation is
increased Japanese support of US military activities at both the
regional and global levels. In October 2014, the two governments
issued the “Interim Report on the Revision of the Guidelines for
Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation” (US Department of Defense
2014). The report declares that the two governments share recog-
nition of the importance of seamless and effective whole-of-gov-
ernment alliance coordination; measures to prevent the deteriora-
tion of Japan’s security; enhanced bilateral cooperation to
generate a more peaceful and stable international security envi-
ronment; cooperation in space and cyberspace in an alliance con-
text; and mutual support in a timely and effective manner. In addi-
tion, the report mentions enhancing their bilateral planning
mechanism, which suggests the establishment of a new military-
to-military planning body.
Cooperation to strengthen the bilateral alliance does not
mean that the security interests of the two countries are com-
pletely identical, particularly on China. For Japan, the rise of
China has vital importance both politically and militarily. Politi-
cally, the competition for Asian leadership in the context of
power transition in Asia has the broadest implication for Japan’s
influence not only in the Asia Pacific but also globally. Militar-
ily, the modernization of China, particularly in disputed maritime
areas, means that Japan is increasingly dependent on Chinese
maritime control if the US maritime presence recedes. Thus,
keeping the US commitment in the region holds vital importance
for Japan.
For the United States, the peace and stability of the Asia
Pacific has strategic importance. Japan is the linchpin of its
security commitment in the region, but the US has long desired
that China become a strong partner within US global leadership.
Therefore, the United States consistently pursues an “engage-
ment and hedging” policy toward China and does not want
Japan to provoke China for fear of precipitating a dangerous
confrontation. That concern is why Washington expressed “dis-
appointment” when Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine in Decem-
ber 2013 and showed some displeasure about his “historical
revisionism.” 
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Reorienting Japan?
It has become customary, particularly among Western observers,
to depict Abe as having two faces, one being the pragmatic real-
ist and the other being the conservative ideologue (Rozman 2015).
According to this picture, the realist Abe seeks to strengthen
Japan’s status and presence in the world and is willing to commit
Japan to universal and sometimes progressive values such as the
promotion of women’s status. However, the ideologue Abe pur-
sues a conservative agenda by emphasizing the virtues of tradi-
tional Japan, including idealizing prewar Japan and denying war
guilt. 
No doubt Abe’s stance has some contradictions, such as his
strong attachment to the US-Japan alliance and his denunciation
of the postwar constitution. Both these themes are part of Japan’s
“postwar regime.” This sort of contradiction and ambiguity of
Abe’s, along with his conservative ideology, has made him a
polarizing figure domestically and a difficult leader to deal with
abroad, including in relations with the United States.
However, Abe maintains high popularity domestically despite
his specific agenda on national security and even though Abe-
nomics does not get high public approval. And internationally,
despite skepticism in his conservative revisionism, he has gener-
ally made headway toward improving relations. 
The explanation of this Abe paradox seems to lie in the condi-
tion that what Abe pursues in his second cabinet, intentionally or
less intentionally, follows the spirit of the age, reflecting the grand-
scale transformation besetting the world. Geopolitically, the retreat
of Russia as an imperialistic power in Asia is the consequence of
the Soviet collapse in East Asia. That has changed the basic frame-
work within which Japanese foreign policy has operated since the
nineteenth century. In order to cope with the Russian advance,
Japan made large commitments to the Asian continent, both on the
Korean peninsula and in China, which later resulted in atrocious
warfare. As South Korea modernizes and China rises, Japan no
longer considers a continental commitment to be vital to its own
security, particularly so long as the United States remains commit-
ted to the defense of both Japan and South Korea. 
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When it comes to Japanese security interests on the Korean
peninsula, over the last two decades Japan has reaffirmed that it
does not have an inherently strategic stake there. True, Japan is
very concerned about North Korean nuclear and missile develop-
ment, but the most effective way to cope with this threat is to
enhance the US commitment to the Korean peninsula rather than
deeply involve Japan. The prospective update of the US-Japan
guideline will broaden the 1997 guideline, which was mostly ded-
icated to the Korean situation, but in reality the new guideline
suggests the lowering of the Korean peninsula’s priority in the
Japanese security agenda.
This lower priority is partly the consequence of the historical
issues between Japan and South Korea, but the change is more
deep-seated and realistic. First, the relative decline of Japan and
South Korea as trading partners has made the relationship more
one between economic competitors. Second, the geopolitical sta-
tus of Japan and South Korea has structurally diverged. For
Japan, the maritime rivalry with the rising naval and maritime
power of China gets top strategic importance because Japan is
surrounded by sea and dependent on sea routes. For South
Korea, deterring the North Korean threat and preparing for
future unification make harmonious management with both the
United States and China vital. Therefore, Japan is likely to be
involved in the peace and security of the Korean peninsula
within the Japan-Korea-US trilateral framework and in various
regional groups, but the United States and China come first in
strategic importance.
Japan’s security and economic interests are increasingly con-
nected with the southwestern world—“China plus one”—the
Japanese say. China is the number-one trading partner for Japan,
but Japanese business is seeking alternatives to China in South-
east Asia, India, the Middle East, and Africa, where future eco-
nomic growth is expected. In security affairs, Japan’s traditional
strength in peacebuilding activities and humanitarian relief efforts
can be important resources for its global diplomacy. These activi-
ties also buttress the United States by supplanting the receding US
presence and indirectly securing the US commitment in the Asia
Pacific, including to Japan.
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Ideologically, too, Japan has reason to strengthen its ties with
southern Eurasia and Africa. Historical memory in these regions
concerning Japan is very different from Asia Pacific’s. Generally,
Japan of the past is seen as another imperial power along with the
Western colonial powers. Japan is guilty of imperial expansion
and war, but the West shares the guilt. That was the stance Indian
judge Radhabinod Pal took at the time of the Tokyo War Crimes
Tribunal (Tokyo Saiban Kenkyukai 1984). 
Pal’s judgment has received somewhat skewed treatment by
Japanese conservatives, who have tried to make it seem that he
was declaring Japan innocent of war crimes. Actually, he took the
stance that Japan cannot be judged guilty because the Tokyo Tri-
bunal was organized by the victorious powers who were also
imperialists. Of course Pal’s stance itself is debatable, but politi-
cally it is convenient to argue that Japan was just one of the guilty
parties. Given Japan’s heightened nationalistic rivalry with South
Korea and China, finding agreement on history with Asian coun-
tries southwest of Japan is much easier and strategically important
than resolving the orthodoxy-versus-revisionism dichotomy cur-
rently prevalent in the Asia Pacific.
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